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ABSTRAC
A
CT
While cy
ybercrime prroliferates – becoming more
m
compleex and surreeptitious on the Internett – the
tools and
d techniquess used in performing
p
digital
d
investtigations arre still largeely lagging b
behind,
effectively slowing do
own law enfo
orcement ag
gencies at larrge. Real-tim
me remote accquisition off digital
evidence over the Intternet is stilll an elusive ideal in thee combat agaainst cybercrime. In thiss paper
we briefly
y describe th
he architectu
ure of a com
mprehensive proactive diigital investiigation systeem that
is termed
d as the Liv
ve Evidence Information
n Aggregatoor (LEIA). T
This system aims at collecting
digital ev
vidence from
m potentially
y any devicce in real ti me over thee Internet. Particular ffocus is
made on
n the importance of the
t
efficienccy of the n
network com
mmunication
n in the ev
vidence
acquisitio
on phase, in
n order to retrieve pottentially eviidentiary in
nformation rremotely an
nd with
immediaccy. Through
h a proof of concept
c
impllementation,, we demonsstrate the liv
ve, remote ev
vidence
capturing
g capabilities of such a system
s
on sm
mall scale deevices, highliighting the n
necessity forr better
throughp
put and availability envisioned throu
ugh the use oof Peer-to-Peer overlays.
Keyworrds: Digital Forensics, Digital
D
Evidence, Remotte acquisitioon, Proactive forensics, Mobile
devices, P2P,
P
Networrk performan
nce, Availab
bility

INTRO
ODUCT
TION
Malevoleent activitiess quickly adapt and evo
olve
to align themselves with the pa
articularitiess of
their giv
ven environm
ment. This is
i seen in th
hat
they aree no longer only a co
onfined to the
physical world. They
y have read
dily adapted to
the digiital realm, taking up
p their nicche
markedly
y on the In
nternet. Exa
amples of su
uch
are the Zeus bank
king Trojan (Stone-Gro
oss,
2012) an
nd the Fla
ame malwa
are (sKyWIper
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Analyysis Team
m, 2012) stealing b
banking
credeentials and p
performing eespionage acctivities
respeectively. T
They are no longerr rare
occurrrences with mild conseq
quences. Theey have
perm
manently sett up camp in intricatte and
surre ptitious forrms, taking unjust adv
vantage
over
unsuspecting
userss
about
going
comm
monplace acctivities on the Interneet. The
Regin
n malwaree (Kasperssky Lab, 2014),
mented in 22014 as
formaally analyzed and docum
a cyb
berespionagee tool, is an
n example oof this,
P
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having said to have been possibly in the wild
since 2003. Today, all activities in digital realm
are at the risk of being compromised by
malicious actors aiming at perpetrating theft,
impersonation, sabotage or to paralyze others’
activities for personal benefit.
The consequences of such malicious
activities for the unsuspecting user have also
become more detrimental, persistent and
having far reaching effects in that they are
largely untraceable and easily invisible to the
untrained
eye.
Developing
novel
and
innovative methods that enable malicious
activities to remain effectively undetected and
untraceable, is the hallmark of these evildoers.
They are almost always one step ahead of the
pursuers. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to
hide among the deluge of data that is created
among communication devices that support
the basic network communication on the
internet. Malevolent activity in the “Digital
Realm” can thus, easily become rampant and
uncontrollable if there are no equally
innovative methods to counter the offending
actors and their activities. The rate of
innovation and uptake of novel techniques by
law enforcement agencies, digital forensics
practitioners and incident responders must at
the very least be equivalent to that of their
criminal counterparts, if they are to keep up
with the proliferation of crime on the Internet.
One of the foremost areas in digital crime
investigations where innovative means of
combatting crime are highly necessary, but
largely lacking, is the evidence capture process.
This is the initial stage of an investigation
where artifacts from the scene of the crime
need to be retrieved in their original form, or,
in the case of digital investigations, in some
form of a complete copy of the original artifact
that can be proven to be devoid of any
tampering (National Institute of Standards and
Technology, 2004) (Scientific Working Group
on Digital Evidence (SWGDE), 2006). This
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process needs to be performed meticulously,
carefully and in many cases slowly in order to
ensure that there is no potentially crucial piece
of evidence left behind. This is the state of
affairs in the real physical world.
However, today’s crime scene is rapidly
edging away from a physical reality into a
more virtual one. The forms of evidence found
in these “Digital Crime Scenes” have also
moved from the traditional fingerprints,
footprints, hair samples, blood samples or
other DNA related evidence, into more digital
artifacts.. Such digital forms of evidence
commonly include hard-disk drives, live
(RAM) memory, network traffic captures,
mobile devices, RAID sets (M. Cohen,
Garfinkel, & Schatz, 2009), and virtually any
other form of technology that records past
events of its actions; that can be captured and
can be analyzed during or after the criminal
event and whose integrity can be verified.
This opens the floor to almost any form of
computer appliance (physical or virtual) that
can be thought of. Thus arises the
heterogeneity problem among devices – or
simply put the seeming lack of standardization
among vendors of devices that perform related
tasks. Different devices may have different
physical
connectors,
operating
systems,
software
applications,
storage
formats,
encoding
schemes
and
communication
protocols (CDESF Working Group, 2006). This
heterogeneity makes the job of a Digital
Investigator a lot more difficult because of the
wide variety in which evidence could manifest
itself in the wild. This greatly hampers any
manual efforts of collecting evidence, even with
the assistance of semi-automated tools of today
such as disk imagers.
In addition to this, Electronic Crime cases
today often involve more than just a single
device. Several computer-like appliances
including tablets, mobile phones, digital
cameras, GPS devices, smart-TV’s and even
© 2015 ADFSL
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embedded devices such as onboard vehicle
computer systems (from trucks, cars and even
ships) could be seized for a single case, in order
to be subjected to further investigative
analysis. If we also bring in the vast realm of
the Internet also into play, such evidence
sources could include web application accounts,
online email accounts, cloud storage facilities,
network traffic captures and logs (Raghavan,
Clark, & Mohay, 2009). It is not difficult to
imagine that all these evidence forms could
easily be part of a single case in today’s world
and even more so in the imminent realm of the
Internet of Things. The sheer volume of data
that one would have to sift through in order to
investigate a single case could be in the order
of Terabytes and can be a more than daunting
task to perform. (Case, Cristina, Marziale,
Richard, & Roussev, 2008)
Furthermore, in the realm of the Internet,
composed of massively interconnected devices
sharing vast amounts of highly varying data,
crossing paths at high velocities, the speed of
the capture of potentially evidentiary
information is of essence. The same levels of
meticulousness and carefulness of physical
evidence acquisition may as well be sacrificed
to some extent for the agility that is needed in
reacting to crime in the digital world. This is
because potentially evidentiary information
that is not captured almost instantaneously, is
likely to be lost forever in just a matter of
seconds. However, this does not mean that all
accuracy and care in collection of digital
evidence artifacts is ignored, rather it is
traded-off and reduced in favour of speed.
Nevertheless, the maintenance of the chain of
custody is always very important in any digital
investigation. New methods of achieving
similar standards of the preservation of digital
evidence to those of physical evidence also
need to be sought after and integrated into
legal standards.

© 2015 ADFSL

Finally, at present, investigators grapple
with the problem of the relatively immature
forensic tools that they are presented with.
Current industry standard forensic tools such
as EnCase, FTK, XRY, Volatility and
Wireshark, at the moment of writing, do not
cater for the highly divergent nature of digital
evidence sources. Most tools focus on a single
niche area such as Filesystem Data, Live
Memory, Network Traffic, Mobile Devices or
Log data. Some have recently begun to expand
their capabilities. The latest version of Encase
Enterprise v7 (Guidance Software, 2014)
claims to acquire evidence from disk drives as
well as RAM and some mobile devices within
an organizational context. AccessData’s FTK
AD Enterprise (AccessData, 2014) also claims
largely similar functionality. Neither deals with
network traffic data yet. They are also yet to
provide a comprehensive method to interface
with all the variety of data present to provide
a uniform investigation platform. In addition
to this, current tools have rather limited
capabilities
for
capturing
potentially
evidentiary data on demand over networks as
well as dealing with extremely large datasets.
Both EnCase and FTK products in their latest
releases seem to allow for remote evidence
acquisition within an enterprise network,
however the performance of these are unknown
and the tools proprietary, thus difficult to
measure. Furthermore, most of such tools
would struggle and would quickly become
problematic when presented with InternetScale crime scenes.
In this paper, we present the architecture
of a scalable, distributed, multi-component
incident response and digital investigation
platform aimed at dealing with large scale
distributed cybercrime investigations. We
name this system the Live Evidence
Information Aggregator, or LEIA, in short.
The LEIA architecture aims at curbing
cybercrime through assisting digital forensics
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i
practitioneers and law enforcement agencies in
improving their diigital crim
me responsse
capabilitiess.
This is to be do
one through
h addressin
ng
several of the
t aforemen
ntioned prob
blems such as
a
the innate and growin
ng complexitty of the fasst
growing “Internet-of-T
Things” types of cases as
a
well as deealing with the constantly growin
ng
amounts of
o heterogen
neous data vis-a-vis th
he
present sh
hortage of physical reesources an
nd
technical capacity wiithin Law Enforcementt.
We also address th
he need fo
or proactiv
ve
collection of evidence from poten
ntial evidencce
sources on
n-demand ov
ver public networks,
n
an
nd
further sho
ow the need
d for availab
bility throug
gh
redundancy
y, and fastter through
hput networrk
transfers such
s
as thosse seen in Peer
P
to Peeer
technologiees. The rest of thiis paper is
i
organized as follows: In Section 2, we review
w
related work
w
outlin
ning shorttcomings of
o
previous siimilar solutiions. Section
n 3 describees
the requ
uirements for a co
omprehensiv
ve
distributed
d digital inv
vestigation platform.
p
Th
he
functionality of thee LEIA system
s
with
particular focus on the networkin
ng componen
nt
is described in Section
n 4. The nettwork-focused
proof of concept
c
imp
plementation
n and resultts
are outlineed in Section
n 5. In Secttion 6 and 7,
7
we summa
arize the worrk done in th
his study an
nd
propose furrther work that
t
may bee done in thiis
area, respeectively.

BA
ACKGR
ROUND
D AND
RELAT
R
TED WO
ORK
Several prrogressive efforts
e
have been mad
de
towards im
mproving thee efficiency of
o the Digita
al
Investigation process. The motiva
ations behin
nd
these hav
ve spawned
d from th
he changin
ng
requiremen
nts of natiional and internationa
al
legal system
ms, the evolution in the digital crim
me
scene, th
he
visible backlogs of casees
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urdening law
w enforcemeent agenciess and
overbu
advancces in technoological capaabilities.
Som
me of thesee efforts incclude: Deleggation
and coollaboration among team
ms; Reductioon of
evidencce sizes throough filteringg out known
n files;
and s imple autoomation of important but
mundaane, repetitiv
ve tasks (ssuch as ind
dexing
data ffor subsequ
uent searchees, file carrving,
parsingg running p
process in m
memory or TCP
flows in network
k captures). Most of these
capabillities have b
been implem
mented in cu
urrent
industrry standard
d forensic tools, how
wever,
investiggators and
d analystss still reemain
overbu
urdened (van
n Baar, vaan Beek, & van
Eijk, 22014). This is because of the pressently
abundaant and steeadily grow
wing amounts of
heteroggeneous and
d disjointed
d datasets from
multiplle sources th
hat they are tasked to collect
and an
nalyze. Meth
hods to alleviate this prooblem
through
h fully automating the remote colleection
and prre-processingg of such data are soo far
either llacking in effficiency or in
n scalability
y.
Sevveral unidireectional sollutions, such
h as,
(Almullhem & T
Traore, 20005) have been
proposeed in a bid
d to solve this multi-faaceted
problem
m, howeveer, they h
have not been
unequivvocally succcessful. In reecent times there
have b
been initiattives to cen
ntralize evid
dence
storagee (Ren & Jin, 2005), but distrribute
processsing among sseveral mach
hines (Rousssev &
Richard
d III, 2004).. There has also been a push
toward
ds having th
he different parties, inv
volved
in solvving a case tto work toggether, even from
geograp
phically seeparate locations (D
Davis,
Manes,, & Shenoi, 2005), p
particularly with
respectt to technicaal staff in niiche areas (such
as filessystem foren
nsics, netwoork forensics, live
memorry forensics or mobile foorensics) and
d the
legal eexperts. Coollaboration has been
n the
mainst ay of the aattempt to get cases ssolved
faster.
ducing the amount oof data thaat is
Red
needed
d to be colllected is aalso a mean
ns of
reducin
ng the amou
unt of time n
needed to an
nalyze
© 2015 AD
DFSL
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the data. This has previously been done
through “Known File Filtering” as well as
through scripts crafted to use heuristics
(Koopmans & James, 2013). Network Security
Monitoring has also been an avenue for
gathering data with the help of Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS’s) assisted through
data mining (Leu & Yang, 2003). However,
this has been the specific mandate of the IDS,
centralized or distributed, as the case may be,
with terminating (end) devices or intermediary
devices generally playing very minor roles in
this task.
As far as is known to the author, there has
not been much done, through any single
initiative, in terms of expanding the scope of
data captured to be the mandate of all possible
devices of reasonable capability. Enabling
individual devices to natively act as part of the
Incidence Response System, towards the aim of
collecting potential evidentiary data, has not
been
widely
studied.
Additionally,
collaboration on the human processing level
has been emphasized, but it has not been
introduced
among
unrelated
networked
devices. These devices could possibly be
harnessed to work together towards aiding in
intelligent real-time capturing, filtering and
processing in order to attain and retain that
which could be considered as possible
evidentiary data, antecedent to the event of a
crime being detected. It is for these reasons
that we delve into this area to explore it
further.
Notable related studies include (Zonouz,
Joshi, & Sanders, 2011), that describes a live
network forensics system that provisions
varying Intrusion Detection Systems on host
machines based on their respective resource
costs. It works in a virtualized environment
where snapshots are taken periodically and
used to revert the system back to the point
before an attack began. Each system rollback
results in different IDSs being deployed to

© 2015 ADFSL

collect new and possibly better information.
This presupposes that the attacker re-enacts
their malicious behavior in a similar way to
their previous attempts, each time their efforts
are thwarted by the system. Storage of the
potential evidentiary information in a
forensically sound manner is not particularly
dealt with in this study. The aim was to
understand attacks better in order to make
better decisions on what kind of preventive
measures to deploy.
The RAFT system (Scanlon & Kechadi,
2010) proposed an architecture for performing
remote evidence acquisition from disks of
computers using a live CD prepared with disk
acquisition tools and networking capabilities.
One of the drawbacks of this system was the
inability to take live captures of the disk thus
requiring the machine to be rebooted as well as
needing a CD Drive or a USB port. The
remote acquisition was also seen to suffer from
speed deficiencies and a need was identified to
improve on this. We extend on this idea but
oriented towards mobile devices. (Scanlon,
Farina, Khac, & Kechadi, 2014) further also
describe a methodology for performing
forensics
on
devices
participating
in
decentralized cloud storage services such as
BitTorrent Sync. They show how the default
replication of data on multiple devices can help
in recovering data despite it having been
maliciously removed to hinder forensic
analysis.
(Shields, Frieder, & Maloof, 2011), (Yu et
al., 2005), (M. I. Cohen, Bilby, & Caronni,
2011), and (Moser & Cohen, 2013) describe
distributed system architectures for proactive
collection and summarization of evidence, with
centralized data storage and processing. They
are, however, particularly directed at closed
domain enterprise systems, where there is some
form of control and order instigated by system
administrators. Participation of computer
systems outside the control of the enterprise is
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not considered. The system being proposed in
this study is aimed at being universal –
applying to the entire Internet.
The work done by Redding in (Redding,
2005) is the most closely related study done in
the area of pro-active and collaborative
computer
forensic
analysis
among
heterogeneous systems. Redding proposes a
peer-to-peer framework for network monitoring
and forensics through which network security
events can be collected and shared among the
peers. “Analysis, forensic preservation and
reporting of related information can be
performed using spare CPU cycles,” (Redding,
2005) together with other spare, under-utilized,
or unused resources. This system however
seems to be designed to collect only network
security events and not any other forms of
evidence from individual host devices
Furthermore it seems to be aimed towards an
“administratively closed environment” under
the control of some systems administrator
within an enterprise. An open system that has
the Internet as its domain of operation
assisting in the collection of any form of
computer based evidence is what is not dealt
with in Redding’s work. Thus, it is this that is
sought after in the current study as will be
described later in this paper.
In order to facilitate uniform, seamless
exchange of forensic artifacts between
heterogeneous
entities,
some
form
of
standardization of the transmitted evidence
formats is necessary. One of the bodies that
has made proposals related to this is the
Common Digital Evidence Storage Format
Working Group (CDESF Working Group,
2006). Other notable efforts include (Schatz &
Clark, 2006) which makes use of the Resource
Description Framework (RDF) from Semantic
Web technologies as a common data
representation layer for digital evidence related
metadata, using ontologies for describing the
vocabulary related to this data, and
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(Kahvedžić & Kechadi, 2009) where a detailed
ontology of Windows Registry artifacts of
interests is introduced. The Open Forensic
Integration Architecture (FIA) in (Raghavan
et al., 2009) and FACE (Case et al., 2008)
describe methods for the integration of digital
evidence from multiple evidence sources in a
bid to facilitate more efficient analysis. The
Advanced Forensic Format (Garfinkel, 2006),
AFF4 (M. Cohen et al., 2009) and XIRAF
(Alink, Bhoedjang, Boncz, & de Vries, 2006)
describe annotated evidence storage formats
that allow for addition of arbitrary metadata
as well as interoperability among different
tools.
In AFF4 (M. Cohen et al., 2009), notably,
remote evidence capture, some form of
availability
through
manually
driven
redundancy, and some parallelism in the
evidence capture process of RAID data sets is
also present. However it seems that the
initiation of these processes is instigated
through human intervention. They are not
fully automated through machine triggers, and
thus could be slow to react in acquiring
evidence. The availability (fail-over) provided
through redundancy is based on whether the
evidence captured is required in other
locations. If it is not required elsewhere, then
the fail-over mechanism would not work
because there would be only one copy of the
evidence.
The
parallelism
(described
particularly for acquiring individual disks in a
RAID set) is unclear whether it could also
apply in parallelizing other potential evidence
data sources such as RAM memory or NAND
storage on mobile devices.
The proposed idea that this study covers is
composed of several areas of specialization,
namely: The Internet of Things (IoT),
Intrusion Detection Systems, Peer to Peer
Networks, Virtualization infrastructures, Large
Scale Cloud storage and Semantic Web
technologies. Most of these technologies have

© 2015 ADFSL
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been previously
p
harnessed in different
capacities, singularlly or in small
s
clusteers,
towards the benefitt of digitall forensics for
today’s
complex
internetw
worked
and
a
intertwin
ned cyber realm. How
wever, to the
author’s knowledge, there has so
s far not beeen
any work
k done otheer than our previous wo
ork
seen in (Homem, 201
13) and (Homem, Dosis, &
Popov, 2013)
2
that aims to merge
m
all th
hese
technolog
gies togetheer, in order to providee a
singular scalable solution
s
tha
at solves the
recurring
g problems of
o large am
mounts of da
ata,
several sources off evidence, inability of
collecting
g evidence efficiently over
o
networrks,
heterogen
neity amon
ng systemss, insufficient
processin
ng power, seecurity and privacy – th
hat
are con
nstantly trroubling diigital foren
nsic
analysts and law
w enforcem
ment agenccies
worldwid
de. We extend our prev
vious work, by
describin
ng the P2P gossiping prrotocol furth
her,
as well as by perrforming teests on larrger
partition sizes with two more mobile deviices
that hav
ve slightly better com
mputing pow
wer.
More inssights related to the peerformance and
a
reliability
y of the remote evidence capture
process are
a also realized through these tests.

CHARA
C
ACTERI
RISTICS
S
OF TH
HE DESIRED
SOLUTIO
ON
Inspired by the ch
hallenges do
ocumented by
Palmer at the fiirst DFRW
WS conferen
nce
(Palmer, 2001), we describe bellow a wish-list
of characcteristics tha
at one woulld like to ha
ave
in a co
omprehensive Digital Forensics and
a
Incident Response system
s
for a public op
pen
domain networked environmentt such as the
Internet. They are aimed at complementing
and upd
dating Palm
mer’s list in
n light of the
current state of electronic
e
crrime and the
present state of forrensic tools, as describ
bed
earlier.
i.

Distributiion: The ability to deal
d
of
with
massive
m
amounts

© 2015 ADFSL
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distrib
bution
in
termss
of
particcipants,
data
sstorage,
processsing and d
dissemination
n. The
system
m needs to be able to handle
the h
heterogeneity
y that may
y come
with d
distributed ssystems as w
well.
ii.

Scalabbility:
Large
scale
intercconnectivity, as well as the
possib
bility of new entities join
ning, as
well aas others leeaving the system
dynam
mically and gracefully w
without
drastiic negative effects oon the
system
m. The aability to easily
improove or exten
nd the capaabilities
of thee system thrrough new m
modules
is alsoo desired.

iii.

Availaability:
Prroviding
ssuitable
levels of function
nality as and
d when
requirred.

iv.

the
Univeersality:
Among
and
lack
heteroogeneity
k
of
standaardization aamong vend
dors of
differeent systems,, there needs to be
some standardizaation and coommon
underrstanding beetween the ssystems
on th
he level of communication and
storagge of poteential evid
dentiary
inform
mation.

v.

Respoonsiveness: T
The system should
be ab
ble to aptlly detect w
when a
been
securiity
policcy
has
thus
violated,
irrecooverably
collectting inform
mation in orrder to
pursu
ue the perrpetrators oof the
crimin
nal actions. This also im
mproves
on effficiency and
d privacy iin that
the system doees not haave to
perpettually be collecting all p
possible
inform
mation froom all p
possible
system
ms.

vi.

Resou
urce Sharin
ng: Today, large
compllex problem
ms that aree being
solved
d through collaboratioon and

P
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sharing of resources as seen in
i
Crowdsourccing, P2P networks,
n
an
nd
cloud infrasstructures. They
T
provid
de
on demand
d rapid av
vailability of
o
large amou
unts of ressources from
m
collective resource
r
poo
ols providin
ng
speed, efficciency and the benefitts
from “the wisdom
w
of the crowd”.
vii.

viii.

ix.

Page 66

Integrity (Trust, Reliability
R
&
Accuracy): As a system
m facilitatin
ng
law enforceement in diigital crimess,
the levels of trust, reliability
y,
accuracy and integrrity of th
he
information
n needs to
t
be hig
gh
enough to
o be acceepted as a
veritable source of evidentiarry
information
n for a courtt of law. Th
he
Daubert sta
andards and
d the chain of
o
custody neeed to be adh
hered to.
Privacy
&
Co
onfidentialityy:
Personally identifiablee and secreet
information
n must be maintained
m
as
a
anonymous and confid
dential as is
i
reasonably
acceptab
ble,
unlesss
incriminated. Unautho
orized accesss
to such in
nformation is
i not to be
b
allowed.
ng
Security: In addition to ensurin
he potentia
al
the securiity of th
evidentiary information
n that it aim
ms
to collect and
a
process, it must alsso
own
security
take
its
intto
consideratio
on – especia
ally in term
ms
of authen
ntication, authorization
a
n,
accountabillity and non
n-repudiatio
on
of activitiess undertaken
n.

LEIA
A: THE
E LIVE
EV
VIDEN
NCE
INFO
ORMA
ATION
AGG
GREGA
ATOR
The L
LEIA is a 44-tiered systtem architeecture
that m
may be desccribed as a combinatioon of
hypervvisors, intrussion detectioon systems, peer
to peerr systems an
nd cloud stoorage. It is made
up of t he followingg components:
a) The Hoost-based Hy
ypervisor (Hb
bH)
b) The
Peer-to-Peeer
Distrib
bution
Architeecture (P2P-da)
Backend (CB
BB)
c) The Clooud-based B
d) The Laaw Enforceement Conttroller
(LEC)
Thee functionallity of each of the layeers of
the LE
EIA system is briefly described in
n the
followin
ng sections.

The Ho
ost-based
d Hypervis
sor
(HBH)
)
The H
Host-based H
Hypervisor ((HbH) systeem is
compossed of a virttualization laayer manageed by
a hypeervisor – a privileged secure plattform
managiing the gueest operatin
ng system (OS).
The hyypervisor coontains an in
nbuilt host-b
based
intrusioon detection
n system alsso termed aas the
embedd
ded intrusion detectioon system (emIDS). Security utilities withiin the guestt OS
such aas anti-malware toolss and intrrusion
detectioon systems maintain their own dataa and
logs th
hat are accesssible to thee HbH. The HbH
collectss and assimiilates the information th
hat it
gets frrom its own
n inbuilt inttrusion deteection
system
m together with oth
her inform
mation
collecteed from the other securrity utilitiess that
may exxist within the guest O
OS. This hellps in
gettingg a better perspective of cu
urrent
malicioous activity tthat may bee underway.
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Furth
her to thiss sharing of
o information
within a single HbH
H system, in
ndividual HbH
H
systems also share their inforrmation abo
out
maliciouss activity th
hey may ha
ave discovered
with ea
ach other. This communication is
Peer-to-P
facilitated
d
throug
gh
the
Peer
Distributtion Archittecture (P
P2P-da). This
T
collabora
ative effort among the HbH systeems
further helps
h
improvee the accura
acy of IDSs and
a
eventuallly forensic data acquisitiion.
In order to reducce the amoun
nt of data th
hat
may neeed to be co
ollected for analysis, ea
ach
HbH maiintains a ha
ash list of th
he local files on
its guestt operating system (Local - Kno
own
Data Ha
ash-List, L-K
KDHL). Th
his L-KDHL
L is
periodica
ally cross-cheecked and updated
u
agaiinst
a Masterr – Known Data
D
Hash-L
List (M-KDH
HL)
stored at
a the Clou
ud-based Ba
ackend (CBB).

d by the Clooud-based B
Backend
This is managed
DE) compon
nent of
Differrencing Enggine (CBB-D
the C
CBB. The aaim of this is to quickly filter
out known sysstem data or files tthrough
matc hing the filees on an HbH
H against haashes of
system
m files thatt are known
n to be benign and
have not been moodified in an
ny way.
A user data profile with
h its corresp
ponding
hash--lists is alsoo created. Th
he user-dataa hashlist iss also mainttained in a d
dual format – with
a locaal copy resid
ding on the HbH and a remote
masteer copy beiing maintaiined at thee CBB.
Furth
her to this tthe actual u
user data is backed
up att the CBB. Thus, the u
user data haash lists
are u
used to check
k which filess have changged and
may need to be b
backed up too the CBB.

Figure 1. The components of the HbH subsystem
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r
to “Known
“
Ma
alicious Filess”
With respect
which aree files that have been
n previouslly
identified as having malicious
m
co
ontent withiin
them, a “K
Known Maliccious File” hash
h
list is to
t
be maintaiined only on
n the CBB. It
I is not helld
on individ
dual HbH sy
ystems as it
i can easilly
become larrge and unmanageable for a singlle
HbH to ma
aintain.
The hy
ypervisor is the
t critical element
e
wheen
it comes to the collection of potentia
al
evidentiary
y data. Haviing privilegeed access, th
he
hypervisor is able to directly
d
interract with th
he
file system
m, network in
nterfaces, meemory cachees
and other low-level resources,
r
which
w
are all
a
primary so
ources of com
mmon eviden
ntiary data in
i
digital inv
vestigations. The emb
bedded IDS’s
(em-IDS) also collectss informatio
on mostly in
i
the form of
o logs which
h are parsed
d to result in
i
synthesized
d alerts. Wh
hen evidentia
ary data from
m
the local HbH is colllected, it iss transmitteed
towards the
t
CBB via neighbouring HbH
H
systems th
hrough the action of the P2P-d
da
system (deescribed in the
t next secction). Whille
such data is in transitt through a neighbourin
ng
HbH systeem, and travelling onw
ward to th
he
CBB, it iss always helld in an enccrypted form
m
and only within
w
tempo
orary storagee.

Th
he Peer-to
o-Peer Diistribution
n
Architect
ture (P2P
P-da)
The essen
nce of the P2P-da is to provid
de
reliability, scalability and rapid throughput of
o
transmitted
d data even in the face of high ratees
of “churn””, that is, large
l
numbers of nodees
joining and
d leaving th
he network. In order to
t
achieve th
his, a cockta
ail of P2P protocols
p
arre
put togeth
her in ordeer to extra
act the besst
qualities of
o these and
d also allow
w for each to
t
compensate for the otther’s shortccomings. Th
he
particular P2P protoco
ols that are put togetheer
in order to
t build thee P2P-da are:
a
Gradien
nt
overlay
protocols
(Sacha,
Dowling
g,
Cunningha
am, & Meier,
M
2006
6) Epidemiic
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protocools (Jelasitty, Voulgaaris, Guerrraoui,
Kerma rrec, & Stteen, 2007), and the BitTorren
nt protocol (B
B. Cohen, 20003).
Theere are 3 main functionalities off the
P2P-daa:
II.
III.

IIII.

Mainten
nance of thee P2P Overlaay
Dissemiination and
d aggregatioon of
Malicious Behavioour Inform
mation
and alerrts.
Incidentt response d
data collectioon

nalities geneerally corresspond
Theese function
to the P2P protocools that mak
ke up the esssence
of th
he P2P-da.. The fu
unction of the
mainteenance of th
he P2P overrlay is faciliitated
mainlyy through graadient (hieraarchical) oveerlays
assisted
d through
h epidemic (gossip-b
based)
overlayys. The disseemination an
nd aggregatiion of
malicioous behavioor informaation is m
mainly
facilitaated by epideemic (gossip
p-based) overlays.
Inciden
nt response data colleection is m
mainly
facilitaated through
h an adaptaation of thee BitTorren
nt protocol. The detaiils behind these
individ
dual function
nalities are d
dealt with in
n the
followin
ng sections.
Maintena
ance of the
e P2P Ove
erlay
The esssence of this is for the overall P2P
networrk to maiintain conn
nectivity am
mong
neighboouring nodees as well ass the larger HbH
node p
population. F
Further to this, the aim
m here
is to liink HbH nod
des in such a way that they
are moost beneficial to each otther as well as to
the ovverall commu
unication off security eevents
and eviidence transsmission aim
ms.
In order to doo this, a hiierarchy is tto be
created
d among thee peer nodess such that those
less en
ndowed with
h resources are lower in
n the
hierarcchy and thoose that aree better end
dowed
are higgher in the h
hierarchy. T
The aim of this is
to enssure that nodes that lack resoources
event
generallly
comm
municate
security
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information, or transmit potentially large
evidence files towards more reliable and stable
peers. It is assumed that nodes with more
resources are more likely to be better equipped
to deal with larger amounts of information and
are also more likely to be online and available
to be communicated with.
A gradient overlay network is suited to
ensure this form of a network structure. It is
built in such a way that a utility metric is used
to determine which nodes are most suitable to
connect to, and which nodes to avoid. This
utility metric is determined from a
combination of factors including the amount of
resources available on a node, the current state
of use of the node and the amount of time that
it has been online. These utility metrics are
shared through random node interactions,
typical of “gossip-based” (epidemic) P2P
protocols in order for nodes to get to know of
other nodes that might be better to link to.
As gossip-based P2P protocols are known
to eventually converge to a generally stable
state, a hierarchy of the HbH systems is thus
formed with the less endowed elements on the
outer edges and the more capable elements
closer towards the centre of the LEIA system
(that is, the CBB).
Mechanics of the Gossiping and Gradient
Overlay
Neighbour (peer) selection is an important
process in maintaining both overlays. This is
because it affects the performance of the
gossiping overlay in its ability to communicate
and converge, and thus also the gradient
overlay. In order to be efficient in converging
information across a network where random
interaction is a key factor, each peer has to be
equipped with good “local knowledge” as well
as “distant knowledge”. In our case this would
require each peer to have knowledge of both
peers that are “nearby” as well as peers that
are “distant”. The distance metric determining

© 2015 ADFSL

this distance could be simple Euclidean
distance in terms the difference between the
utility metrics of devices, or some other useful
sense of distance, such as the geographic
distance. Thus each peer should store
information of “nearby” devices termed as the
similar set, consisting of devices with similar
utility metrics; as well as a set of devices which
are distant in terms of the utility metric,
termed as the “random set”. This mix of
nearby and distant peer knowledge would also
assist in preventing partitioning of the network
due to excessive clustering.
For the gradient overlay to be maintained,
each peer should also maintain information
about a set of peers that has “weaker” utility
metrics and a set that has “stronger” utility
metrics. This is in done in order to maintain
communication between peers where the
hierarchy of the gradient is needed. Such is the
case when a peer needs to pass on more
computationally intensive tasks, or when
ensuring that evidence is transported onward
to a more stable peer. We term these lists the
subordinate list and the superior list,
respectively.
These lists are exchanged among peers
periodically and randomly. This means that a
peer picks a peer either from its similar set or
its random set and exchanges all or part of its
subordinate and superior lists if they are
different. Thresholds need to be set in order to
ensure that the exchanges do not result in only
a particular set of peer information being
exchanged, however these thresholds are not
further discussed in this study. Additionally, a
list of “recently seen peers” should also be
maintained in order to avoid cycling between
the same peers repeatedly.
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Dis
isseminatio
on and Agg
gregation
of Malicio
ous Behav
viour Inform
mation &
Alerts
This capa
ability is necessary in
i
order to
t
facilitate the collabora
ative mechan
nisms needeed
to ensure that securiity event in
nformation is
i
shared, an
nd that pottentially useeful evidencce
information
n is cap
ptured efficciently an
nd
transmitted
d
securelly.
Securrity
even
nt
information
n known by individual HbH peers is
i
duly shareed out to others
o
in order
o
for th
he
overall sy
ystem to have
h
a mo
ore informeed
security po
osture as weell as to be forewarned
f
of
o
imminent malicious ev
vents. This includes th
he
distribution
n of malicio
ous activity signatures as
a
well as th
he discovery of malicious activitty
originating
g from certtain hosts. When succh
messages are
a received,, only a set of the mosst
common an
nd recently active maliccious activitty
signatures are maintained at the HbH. Thesse
kinds of messages
m
are termed as “Managemen
“
nt
messages” and can be shared out to any peerrs
that a partticular HbH has addresss informatio
on
about and that have co
onnectivity.
ypes of messsages that arre
The other major ty
n this funcctionality arre termed as
a
involved in
“Security Incident Co
ontrol messsages”. Thesse
messages facilitate the reactiion to th
he
detection of a malicious event. This mainlly
includes th
he communiication of procedures
p
to
t
initiate thee evidence ca
apture proceess on certaiin
componentts of certa
ain nodes as well as
a
initiating initial prre-processing
g such as
a
determinin
ng IP addresses of recenttly connecteed
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devicess in order too extend the evidence capture
processs to other su
uspected devices.
Theere may be other forms of messagess that
might need to traaverse the P
P2P-da; how
wever,
the 2 categories m
mentioned tthus far aree the
major ttypes.
Incident r
response d
data collect
tion
This fu
unctionality is triggered by the deteection
of m alicious ev
vents via the colleective
knowleedge gained through coollaborating HbH
system
ms, the em-IIDS and gu
uest OS seccurity
mechan
nisms. For more volatiile data succh as
networrk traffic and live memoory, a fixed time
period is chosen for which to perform
m the
capturee process (or a fix
xed numbeer of
snapsh ots of the d
data over a short periood of
time p articularly ffor live mem
mory) after w
which
a decission is to b
be made whether subseq
quent
capturees need to be made, or w
whether whaat has
been ccollected so far suffices.. Correspond
dence
with tthe Cloud-B
Based Back
kend-Differencing
Enginee (CBB-DE)) filters outt known sy
ystem
files th
hrough facilittating the h
hash compariisons.
Primarry analysiss for IP addresses and
hostnam
mes on the data collectted may resu
ult in
triggeriing of otheer HbH systems to caapture
data allso.
Thee actual data collection proceedure
involvees 3 stages aas described
d in the folloowing
section
ns. The diaggram below (Fig. 2) deepicts
the datta collection
n and transffer process oof the
P2P-daa.
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Figure 2: The P2P-da Data Transfer process
a) Data Partitioning
Different data formats (memory dumps,
logs, files, packet captures, disk images)
are compressed and stored temporarily
on the HbH system in a modified AFF4
data structure that also contains simple
RDF metadata describing the evidence.
This data structure is termed as the
Incident Data Archive (IDA). Each
IDA data structure is partitioned in
equal size pieces that will be referred to
as shards. The shard is a signed and
encrypted partition of the IDA
analogous to the idea of a “piece” in the
BitTorrent Protocol. A metadata file
termed as the “reflection” (which
corresponds
to
the
BitTorrent
Metadata file) is also created and sent
directly to the CBB. In this way the
CBB acts as the “tracker” and “leeches”
IDAs from participating HbH systems
in the P2P-da, thus benefiting from the
© 2015 ADFSL

high throughput of the BitTorrent
protocol
b) Shard Distribution
Multiple copies of each individual shard
are distributed to more capable
neighbors (supporters), facilitated by
the gradient overlay. Each time a shard
is passed on it increases its “heat level”.
After a certain “heat” threshold (that
we refer to as the “melting point”) a
HbH system is obliged to directly
upload to the CBB (more specifically
the HbH Master Peers of the CBB),
else an election procedure is initiated to
determine which previously supporting
HbH should be delegated the uploading
task. In order to avoid an individual
node being the only “proxy” and thus a
potential single point of failure,
individual HbH systems are only
allowed to partake in uploading a
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ards governeed
certtain numberr of IDA sha
by the “dep
pendency value”.
v
Thiis
imp
proves the overall
o
relia
ability of th
he
larg
ger system through reducing
r
th
he
posssibility of having
h
a sin
ngle point of
o
failure in the trransmission process.
ment reconsttruction
c) Rapid fragm
ar shard, do
ownloads arre
Forr a particula
inittiated from
m all their respectiv
ve
sup
pporter locations. This is done fo
or
and
redundancy
bandwidth
max
ximization purposes.
p
Siimilar to th
he
BitTorrent Pro
otocol downlload, prioritty
is given
g
to the shards that are the leasst
com
mmonly avaiilable, that is,
i those tha
at
hav
ve the fewestt recorded su
upporters.
In order to reconstitutee the IDA
A,
individual hash
hes of shards are verifieed
as they
t
are receeived, againsst that in th
he
refllection. Seveeral supporteers upload at
a
the same timee, thus if a shard is in
i
erro
or, that fro
om another supporter is
i
tak
ken. Once successfully transferred
d,
sha
ards are deeleted from
m supportin
ng
HbH
H systems.

The
T Clou
ud-based Backend
B
(C
CBB)
The CBB system
s
is a highly
h
availa
able, scalablee,
responsive,, centralized back end sttorage servicce
capable of storing larg
ge amounts of data in a
homogeneo
ous form. It
I is subdiv
vided into 3
major com
mponents: Th
he Storage System (SS)),
the Differeencing Engiine (DE) an
nd the HbH
H
Master Peeers.
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Thee Storage Sy
ystem (SS) is built upon the
Hadoop
p HDFS arcchitecture (S
Shvachko, Ku
uang,
Radia, & Chansleer, 2010) th
hat providess not
only tthe raw stoorage capab
bilities but also
and
reliability
scalabi lity,
avaiilability,
responssiveness. Th
he Differenciing Engine (DE)
filters out known
n files befoore having them
stored on the C
CBB. This is provisioned
through
h the MapR
Reduce (Deaan & Ghemaawat,
2008) capabilities supported by Hadoop. The
DE alsso provides a query-resp
ponse mechaanism
to thee HBH sysstems with information
n on
known benign daata as partt of the M
Master
Known
n Data Hassh-List (M-K
KDHL). The MKDHL contains data abou
ut known files,
memorry processess, protocol flows, and
d log
entries and thus enables theeir removal from
IDAs b
being preparred. This reduces the siize of
IDAs before bein
ng stored on the Storage
System
m (SS) of th
he CBB. Veersions of k
known
data en
ntries in th
he M-KDHL need also tto be
maintaained in a sccalable manner; howeveer the
mechan
nics of this iis not discusssed in this study.
Thee HbH Mastter Peers aree a particulaar set
of weell-endowed peers thaat are dirrectly
connectted to the coore CBB sysstem (that iss, the
SS and
d DE) providing an inteerface to thee rest
of the LEIA system
m through the P2P-da. They
do not have other core functionalities unreelated
to th
heir LEIA responsibiilities and are
essentiaally the baackbone of the P2P-daa and
ultimattely the proovider of con
nnectivity oof the
LEIA system outtwards to the other HBH
system
ms. The HBH
H Master Peeers also serrve as
the ceentral poin
nt through which sy
ystem
softwarre updates aand maliciou
us event deteection
heuristtics are originated from and dissemin
nated
outwarrds to the HB
BH systems in the wild.
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Figure 3:: The Cloud--based Back
kend compon
nents

The Law
L
Enfor
rcement
Contr
roller Syst
stem
The Law
w Enforcemeent Controller is the main
m
interface that law
w enforcement person
nnel
interact with
w
in ordeer to perform
m their directed
analysis for a particular digita
al investigation
case. Th
hrough it, a Law Enforrcement Agent
can initiiate specific queries to the data sets
s
stored on
n the CBB, thus retrieving detailled,
structureed informa
ation as well
w
as new
n
knowledg
ge inferred through corrrelation of data
originatin
ng from different sourrces that may
m
help in solving
s
a ca
ase. The aim
m of this is to
automatee otherwise manual
m
task
ks of correlating
data from
m different heterogeneo
ous sources in
order to pose valid
d assertions based on the
data tha
at could asssist a foren
nsic analyst in
performin
ng their du
uties of ma
aking sense of
digital arrtifacts. Thiss functionaliity is describ
bed
in more detail in (Dosis, Hom
mem, & Pop
pov,
2013).
f
the new fou
und
Addittionally, from
knowledg
ge obtaineed through
h correlatiion,
patterns of maliciouss activities are
a to be lea
arnt
and storeed. These Malicious
M
Activity Patteerns
are to bee used as feedback to the HbH systeems
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in orrder to imprrove the dettection capaabilities
of th
he inbuilt ID
DS’s and theereby also im
mprove
the aaccuracy of collection of data of pootential
foren
nsic evidentiaary use.

PROO
OF OF C
CONCE
EPT
LUATIO
ON AN
ND
EVAL
RESUL
LTS
As t he first parrt of testin
ng the motivations
behin
nd the desiggned architeecture, we d
decided
to focus on the netw
work transm
mission
comp
ponent as it is critical in enh
hancing
speed
dier evidence collectioon. In ord
der to
demoonstrate thee need for better throughput
netwoorks and tthe need foor redundan
ncy for
availaability, such
h as those exhibited iin P2P
overlaays, an expeeriment was set up to siimulate
the cconditions oof the LEIA, however w
without
the P
P2P-da com
mponent. Th
his means th
hat the
experriment
waas
perform
med
with
h
the
transsmission
oof
potentiially
evid
dentiary
inform
mation from
m an HbH sy
ystem to th
he CBB
over a traditionaal client-serv
ver paradigm
m. The
experriment itselff focused on the time taaken to
perfoorm remote extraction, compressioon and
transsmission of iincreasingly larger disk images
over an encryptted channel from smalll scale
P
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devices over the Internet and the subsequent
reconstruction and storage of this data on a
Hadoop HDFS cluster. The success rate of each
evidence acquisition trial run was also
considered to determine reliability.
It should be mentioned that for the sake of
simplicity of the experiment, the actual
hypervisor of the HbH system was not built,
however
closely
similar
conditions
–
particularly in terms of the LEIA prototype
application having privileged access – were
Table 1
Small scale device specifications
Device
Platform

met. In order to test and measure the
performance of the proof of concept application
working over the client-server paradigm, six
different small scale devices were used. Two
rounds of testing were performed: the first
round with the first 4 less powerful devices,
and the second round with the 2 more
powerful devices. The table below outlines the
specifications of the devices being captured.

Processor

Chipset
Freescale
i.MX233

RAM

Disk

64MB

64MB

Chumby Classic

Busybox v1.6.1

350MHz
ARM926EJ-S

HTC Incredible S

Android OS v2.3.3
(Gingerbread)

1 GHz
Scorpion

Qualcomm
MSM8255
Snapdragon

768MB

1.1GB

HTC MyTouch 4G Slide

CyanogenMod
10.2 Alpha

Dual‐core
1.2GHz Scorpion

Qualcomm
Snapdragon S3
MSM8260

768MB

4GB

1GB

8GB

Samsung Galaxy Tab 2
(WiFi Only)
Samsung Galaxy S4
LTE-A

Google Nexus 5
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Android OS, v4.0.3
(Ice Cream Sandwich)

Dual‐core
1GHz

TI OMAP 4430

Android OS v 5.0.1
Quad-core
(Lollipop)
2.3 GHz Krait 400

Qualcomm
MSM8974
Snapdragon 800

2GB

16GB

Quad-core
2.3 GHz Krait 400

Qualcomm
MSM8974
Snapdragon 800

2GB

16GB

Android OS v 5.1.1
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Figure 4. The experimental set up
For the testing and the performance
evaluation, partitions of the various devices
were filled to specific size limits with random
files, including images, PDFs, music files and
compressed archive files (RARs) in order to
simulate normal disk usage. These devices were
subsequently captured over the network.
In the first round, the capture process was
repeated 10 times for each individual partition
size on each device in order to get the average
file transfer times that each size took. The
sizes measured were taken at 9 intervals with
gradually increasing sizes. The maximum size
of 4GB was taken as the largest size because
the average capture (file transfer) times were
beginning to take rather long periods (50-80
minutes)
per
test
acquisition
round.
Furthermore, the maximum disk size on any of
the devices available for testing was 8GB (with
the rest being 4GB, 1.1GB and 64MB). A 4GB
mini-SD card was also available and was used
to supplement the HTC Incredible S in order
to simulate a larger disk size. The Chumby
Classic only had 64MB available of flash

© 2015 ADFSL

(NAND)
memory,
and
no
expansion
capabilities, thus it was not included in the
testing for remote data transfer performance as
there was no way to increase the size of the
storage capacity. It was, however, used in
testing to show that the remote device capture
of such a small scale device running on a Linux
based platform was possible. It was also used
as the main prototyping device because it had
a rather small storage capacity that enabled
rather quick disk acquisitions when testing the
software developed.
The repetition process and the use of the
averaging were done in order to compensate for
the effects of random processes that could have
affected network transmission times. Such
random processes could include network traffic
from other users of the networks being used,
phone calls coming in and interfering with the
I/O processes of the devices, or applications
being updated on the devices, among others.
The tables below show the partition sizes
used and the average times (in milliseconds)
taken
to
perform
the
transfer:
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Table 2
First Round Results – Tests on "HTC Incredible S"
Partition
Avg. File Transfer
# of Test Runs
Amount used
time (ms)
16MB
10
13664
133MB
10
84600.8
250MB
10
392323.9
507MB
10
553933.1
1000MB
10
978571.8
1500MB
10
1360375
2000MB
10
2932376.8
3000MB
10
3877676.8
4000MB
10
4814006.6

Avg. File Transfer
time (Minutes)
0.23
1.41
6.54
9.23
16.31
22.67
48.87
64.63
80.23

Table 3
First Round Results – Tests on "HTC MyTouch 4G Slide"
Partition
# of Test Runs
Avg. File Transfer
Avg. File Transfer
Amount Used
time (ms)
time (Minutes)
21.4MB
10
8583
0.14
87.0MB
10
31467
0.52
255MB
10
230709
3.85
500MB
10
338180
5.64
1000MB
10
1174482
19.57
1550MB
10
1323845.90
22.06
2000MB
10
1673928
27.90
3000MB
10
2052952.40
34.22
4000MB
10
3015056.60
50.25
Table 4
First Round Results – Tests on "Samsung Galaxy Tab 2"
Partition
# of Test
Avg. File Transfer
Avg. File Transfer
Amount Used
Runs
time (ms)
time (Minutes)
4MB
10
1235
0.02
11MB
10
67608
1.13
250MB
10
286947
4.78
500MB
10
426783
7.11
1000MB
10
960952
16.02
1500MB
10
1488236
24.80
2000MB
10
2829355
47.16
3000MB
10
2951551
49.19
4000MB
10
3707556
61.79
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The data above from three of the four
different specimen devices used in the first
round was plotted on a graph in order to
visualize the general trend of the file transfer

time against the partition size for the client
server network paradigm of remote evidence
acquisition. The diagram that follows depicts
the graph that was attained:

5000

HTC MyTouch 4G Slide
4500

HTC Incredible S

File Transfer Time (Secs)

4000

Samsung Galaxy Tab 2
3500
3000
2500
2000
1500
1000
500
0
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500

1000

1500
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2500

3000

3500

4000

4500

Partition Size Used (MB)
Figure 5. Remote Acquisition Performance from First Round of Tests using Client-Server paradigm
In the second round of testing and
performance evaluation the two most powerful
and best equipped devices were tested. The
process from round one was replicated, but
now with larger partition sizes since these 2
devices had larger disk storage capacity
(16GB). It was noticed in the first round that
capturing the larger partition sizes was not
always successfully completed. In the first
round, in order to collect 10 time duration
values for the larger partition sizes, often more
than 10 trial runs were required. Connection

© 2015 ADFSL

time-outs due to random failures either on the
devices, the network, or on the server side were
deemed to be the cause of failure.
Thus in the second round it was
determined that strictly 10 runs would be
taken and an average of these would be the
resulting estimated value. Among the 10 trial
runs the number of successes and failures
would be recorded. This would enable
determining the average success rate for ever
increasing partition sizes.
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The tables that follow indicate the
partition size intervals and the respective time

durations taken. The number of successes out
of 10 trials per partition size is also indicated.

Table 5
Second Round Results – Tests on "Samsung Galaxy S4"
Partition
# of Successful
Avg. File Transfer
Avg. File Transfer
Amount Used
Trials
time (Sec)
time (Minutes)
263MB
10
275
4.58
535MB
10
535
8.92
1055MB
10
887
14.78
2168MB
10
1735
28.92
3221MB
10
2617
43.62
4304MB
9
3358
55.97
6470MB
6
5311
88.52
8637MB
6
6953
115.88
10247MB
5
8373
139.55
12778MB
4
10472
174.53
15758MB
3
13088
218.13
Table 6
Second Round Results – Tests on “Google Nexus 5”
Partition
# of Successful
Avg. File Transfer
Amount Used
Trials
time (Sec)
263MB
10
270
535MB
10
497
1074MB
10
820
2168MB
9
1780
3221MB
10
2757
4304MB
8
3526
6470MB
5
5412
8637MB
4
7119
10247MB
2
9369
12778MB
2
13001
15758MB
2
15117
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Avg. File Transfer
time (Minutes)
4.50
8.28
13.67
29.67
45.95
58.77
90.20
118.65
156.15
216.68
251.95
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Figure 6. Remote Acquisition Performance from 2nd Round of Tests using Client-Server
paradigm
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Figure 7: Remote Acquisition Successes out of 10 Trials from 2nd Round of Tests using ClientServer paradigm
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DISC
CUSSIO
ON
In Figure 5, taken fro
om the data
a in the firsst
round of tests,
t
the curves
c
seem to start off
with a lineear relationship which soon seems to
t
turn into more
m
of an exponential relationship
p.
The “HTC MyTouch 4G
4 Slide” cleearly portray
ys
this characcteristic, witth the rest of
o the devicees
also exhib
biting this however
h
nott as vividly
y.
Overall there seems to
o be a moree exponentia
al
relationship
p between th
he Partition Size and th
he
File Transsfer Time with respect to the largeer
sizes of partitions. One could posiit that as th
he
partition sizes incrrease, even
n to sizees
substantiallly larger th
han those in
n the graph
h,
the relatiionship willl become ever morre
exponentia
al. This mea
ans that thee times takeen
to acquiree such parrtition sizes would be
b
increase in
n exponentiial magnitud
de and thu
us
shows thatt the client-server parad
digm is likelly
not suitablle enough fo
or the task of
o performin
ng
remote eviidence acquisition, espeecially in th
he
type of en
nvironment that
t
the LE
EIA system is
i
aimed at. This
T
could im
mply the neeed for a morre
efficient network
n
tran
nsfer paradiigm for thiis
type of activity
a
in order to enhance th
he
throughputt.
Howeveer, in Figuree 6, taken frrom the datta
nd
in the 2 round
r
of tessts – using more
m
powerfu
ul
devices as well as larg
ger partition
n sizes – th
he
curves seem
m to take a more linearr shape. Thiis
could be attributed to a varietty of factorrs
including the
t availability of betterr hardware in
i
the form of CPU capacity, higher RAM, betteer
network cards,
c
betteer I/O speeds betweeen
componentts, updated software, keernel modulees
and drivers such as th
he Android ION
I
memorry
manager.
m
differen
nce between
n the sets of
o
The major
devices useed in the firsst round and
d those in th
he
nd
2 round is the impro
ovement in hardware
h
an
nd
software capabilities.
c
It could be
b said tha
at
lower specc devices may not be able
a
to scalle
well with large
l
amoun
nts of storagee space to be
b
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transfeerred over the networrk. Higher spec
devicess may be ab
ble to scale suitably witth an
increasse in disk sstorage, how
wever, perhaaps a
mismattch in term
ms of a siggnificantly llarger
differen
nce between
n what is ffitted into these
mobile devices b
by default and addittional
externaal storage attached to them (E.g.
through
h large SD ccards) may cause the sccaling
of rem
mote evidencce acquisitioon to defer from
the lineear pattern.
As was noted in the first round of tessting,
and th
hus measurred further in the seecond
round, the success rate of the remote evid
dence
acquisiition reduced
d with largeer partition sizes.
This iss seen in T
Tables 5 & 6 as well as in
Figure 7. As the p
partition sizees and effecttively
the aamount of data req
quiring traansfer
increasses, the chaances of a one-time su
uccess
were seeen to reducce. This can be attributted to
the fa ct of the data transffer times taking
rather long, thus increasing tthe time-window
(and thus the likelihood) in which
h an
unpred
dictable netw
work interrup
ption could cause
the traansfer to fail.. Additionally, it was nooticed
that ass the availab
ble disk spacce gradually came
closer to being fu
ully utilized, the more likely
the deevices were to behave erratically. The
generall erratic nature of su
uddenly freeezing
(requirring a rebooot) while performingg the
remotee evidence capture, aas well as the
presencce of error notificationss related to high
disk ussage, were ob
bserved in b
both devices used
in the second rou
und of tests.. The lack oof an
expanssion slot for eexternal secoondary storaage in
the form
m of an SD card on the Nexus 5 perrhaps
could h
have led too slightly woorse perform
mance
comparred to the G
Galaxy S4. IIt is possiblee that
the Gaalaxy S4 mad
de use of the SD card p
placed
in its expansion sslot to cach
he data; how
wever
this waas not indepeendently verrified.
In the proof oof concept sset-up, partiitions
are cap
ptured throu
ugh the “dd” tool, comprressed
and strreamed over an encrypteed channel tto the
Cloud- based-backeend (CBB)) storage site,
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where the actual file is reconstructed. Other
than the inherent re-transmission capabilities
of the underlying TCP protocol, the proof of
concept does not embody its own extra
recovery method for transmission failures.
Thus, if a network failure interrupts the
streaming, a large file being reconstructed on
the CBB end could be left incomplete. In the
event the device being captured also goes
offline, then the evidence may be irrecoverably
lost in this Client-Server scenario.
It should be noted, though, that storage
failures were dealt with through the replication
afforded by Hadoop HDFS that was managing
the CBB backend filesystem. Thus, some form
of availability and thus reliability was
achieved, though only for evidence data
successfully saved in storage at least once.
From the results gathered in the test
experiments we discover that larger partition
sizes may not scale well in remote evidence
acquisition depending on the capabilities of the
device need. Additionally we do see that
devices with better hardware could scale well
with data sizes that proved problematic for less
capable devices. Furthermore we see that for
large partition sizes the remote acquisition
times do increase to significantly long times
(over 4hrs for >14GB), thus the likelihood of a
failure occurring during these large durations
increases. We postulate that the use of P2P
networks, between the evidence capture
location and the eventual storage location,
could be used to assist in providing availability
through replication of data at multiple peers,
as well as better throughput through using the
bandwidth of multiple peers to facilitate
uploading of potential evidentiary data.
Certain P2P overlays such as the BitTorrent
protocol are known to provide better network
throughput, and thus shorter latency times
between evidence capture and storage. Others
are known to provide high availability through
replication of data at multiple peers thus

© 2015 ADFSL

reducing the problem of a single point of
failure that may be experienced with mobile
devices
having
intermittent
network
connectivity. This could also potentially
increase the time-window in which evidence
can be gathered aiding in the need for
collecting as much evidence as possible in
digital investigations.
Smaller file sizes being transmitted over
the network are seen to have a higher
likelihood of succeeding, thus splitting up the
larger partitions into smaller pieces before
transmission may also help reduce failures.
This is also a common trend in P2P overlay
networks such as BitTorrent where large files
are split into smaller pieces, thus furthering
our hypothesis of using P2P overlays to help
improve availability and network throughput.
Another alternative paradigm that could assist
in improving reliability of remote evidence
capture would be to collect and transmit
metadata of the activities occurring on various
evidence sources (disk, memory or network)
rather than transferring the entire evidence
source. The metadata repositories are likely to
be smaller in size and thus transferring and
replicating these among peers during the
remote evidence capture process, could prove
to be more efficient through promoting the
reliability seen in the transfer of smaller files.
In determining the success rates of the
remote evidence acquisition, it should be
mentioned that only 10 trial runs were done
per partition size because the evidence
acquisition times were getting significantly
longer. More than 10 trials proved to be
inconvenient and a hindrance given the time
constraints in performing this study. Ten trials
were deemed to be good enough to show some
form of indicative result, even though the
value of 10 may not represent a statistically
significant sample size to generalize the results
as being fully representative of the
phenomenon being analyzed.
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CONC
CLUSIO
ON
In this study
s
we outlined th
he numerou
us
problems that
t
blight the digital investigatio
on
process, an
nd law enforcement agen
ncies at largee,
rendering them
t
slow and ultimatelly ineffectivee.
We propossed a compreehensive arch
hitecture of a
proactive, system – that mak
kes used of
o
hypervisorss,
P2P networks,
the
RDF
F
framework and cloud storage
s
– that could hellp
improve the digitall investigattion processs
through au
utomation. Through
T
a small proof of
o
concept, we
w demonstra
ate a limited
d part of thiis
system sho
owing remotte evidence acquisition
a
of
o
small scalee devices oveer public nettworks. From
m
the results of testing this
t
proof off concept, we
w
motivate th
he need for a network paradigm
p
tha
at
enables mo
ore reliability and betteer throughpu
ut
of the nettwork transsfer process. Some P2P
P
overlays, such as th
he BitTorrent protoco
ol
demonstratte these ch
haracteristicss and coulld
possibly prrovide the so
olution to im
mproving th
he
speed and
d reliability
y of remo
ote evidencce
capture.
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FUTU
TURE W
WORK
Though
h this archiitecture is p
promising, llarger
disk accquisitions n
need to be performed with
more modern sm
mall scale d
devices thatt are
equippeed with largger storage capacities in order
to furth
her confirm the need forr a more effi
ficient
and re liable form of network data transffer in
the forrm of P2P communicaation. From
m the
proposeed architecture, seveeral param
meters
within the P2P coommunicatioon protocols need
furtherr optimizatioon and testiing. Addition
nally,
a PKII infrastructture can bee infused in
n the
system
m in order too improve th
he security oof the
commu
unication and storage faacilities. Alsoo, the
storagee capabilitties of th
he Cloud-b
based
Backen
nd could bee supplemen
nted by that of
particip
pating HbH
H nodes in oorder to reallize a
distributeed,
and
more
decentralized
indepen
ndent storagge solution. The conceept of
privacyy also needss to be addrressed within
n the
scope oof this soluttion. Finally
y, an experiiment
with a wider scope, in terrms of mu
ultiple
devicess being testeed simultaneously, wou
uld be
greatlyy desired in
n order to b
better drivee this
architeecture toward
ds becomingg a reality.
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